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Blockchain & Web3

Smart Contract Development Services

Smart contracts written and audited as the unforgiving, immutable, publicly-attackable software they are, by engineers who will also tell you when your problem never needed a contract at all.

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What Smart Contract Development means in practice

Who it’s for: Teams that genuinely need self-executing on-chain logic holding real value (a token, a protocol, a multi-party settlement mechanism), and want it written, tested and independently audited by senior engineers who treat immutability and public exploitability as the defining constraints, rather than a cheap-and-fast shop that will ship an unaudited contract and leave you holding an irreversible liability.

Smart contract development is the writing, testing, auditing and deployment of self-executing code that runs on a blockchain. Most often Solidity or Vyper on Ethereum and other EVM-compatible chains, occasionally other languages on other platforms. A contract is a program that holds state and value, and executes its rules automatically and identically on every node in the network, with no operator able to intervene. That is the whole appeal: rules that run exactly as written, that no single party can pause, reverse or quietly amend. It is also, precisely, the danger.

Because a deployed contract is immutable and executed faithfully by everyone, a bug is not a defect you patch on Monday: it is potentially irreversible loss, publicly visible and publicly exploitable the moment it is live. This is one of the highest-stakes forms of software engineering there is. The well-known catastrophes in this field: reentrancy draining a contract, an integer overflow minting value from nothing, a missing access check letting a stranger take ownership, an oracle manipulated to lie about a price, were not exotic. They were ordinary engineering mistakes, made unforgiving by the fact that the code sat on top of real value and could not be recalled. We treat the work accordingly: closer to safety-critical systems than to a typical web build.

This service covers the whole secure development lifecycle: specification, test-driven implementation against established patterns, static analysis, testnet deployment, independent audit and only then mainnet. It sits alongside our broader blockchain development service, which builds the chains, permissioned networks and the off-chain systems around the contracts, and the dApp work that makes an on-chain core usable. And it carries the same honest stance those services do: much of what people want a smart contract for does not need a blockchain, or a contract, at all, and we will say so before you commit a build budget.

What you get

  • A written specification of exactly what the contract must and must not do. The states, the actors, the permissions and the invariants that must always hold, settled before any contract code is written, because ambiguity here becomes a permanent bug later
  • Implementation in Solidity or Vyper built on well-reviewed standard libraries (OpenZeppelin and its peers) rather than bespoke reimplementations of solved problems, with token standards (ERC-20, ERC-721, ERC-1155) implemented to spec where they apply
  • A comprehensive test suite written test-first, unit tests, integration tests, fork tests against real chain state, and adversarial tests that assume the contract will be attacked, with the invariants asserted explicitly rather than hoped for
  • Static analysis and, where warranted, property-based and fuzz testing wired into the build, so whole classes of vulnerability are caught mechanically before a human ever reviews the code
  • A deliberate upgradeability decision (proxy pattern with its trade-offs made explicit, or genuine immutability), chosen for your risk model rather than defaulted into, plus access control and key custody designed as first-class concerns
  • Gas profiling and optimisation where it is worth doing, done after correctness and never at its expense, with the trade-offs of each optimisation written down
  • An independent security audit of every contract before it touches real value, ours arranged with a reputable third party, or coordinated with one you engage, because in this domain a self-reviewed contract holding value is an unbounded, irreversible liability

What Smart Contract Development does for you

  • Bugs found before they become permanent

    The entire value of security-first smart contract work is that the mistakes are caught while they are still cheap to fix, in the specification, the test suite, the static analysis, the testnet and the audit, rather than in production, where a bug is not a ticket but a drained contract with no undo. Every one of the famous losses in this space was, at root, a defect that a rigorous lifecycle would have surfaced before deployment. What we deliver is not speed; it is that what goes to mainnet has been attacked repeatedly in a safe environment first, so it does not get attacked for the first time when it is holding your users’ value.

  • Standards over cleverness, so the attack surface stays small

    Most of what a contract needs to do has been solved, reviewed and battle-tested by the whole industry already, token logic, access control, safe arithmetic, pausing, upgrade proxies. We build on those established implementations rather than reinventing them, because every line of bespoke cleverness is a line that has never been audited by anyone but us. The benefit is a smaller attack surface and a contract that a reviewer, an auditor and your own future engineers can actually reason about, instead of a novel construction whose failure modes nobody has seen yet.

  • An honest verdict on whether you need a contract at all

    Before any of the above, you get the most valuable thing we offer on this work: a plain answer to whether your problem needs a smart contract, or a blockchain, in the first place. A great many briefs that arrive asking for a contract describe logic that a conventional backend runs more simply, more cheaply and (crucially), reversibly, with the option to fix a mistake that on-chain code never has. When that is the finding, we say so before you spend a build budget, and consider it a successful engagement even though it ends the conversation.

Why teams choose us for Smart Contract Development

  • You understand that a smart contract is immutable, public and exploitable the instant it deploys, and you want it engineered by people who treat that as the central constraint rather than a footnote, with test-driven development, static analysis and an independent audit as non-negotiable, not upsells.
  • You want contracts built on well-reviewed standard libraries and established patterns, kept small and composable, rather than a novel construction whose failure modes nobody has audited, because in this field original cleverness is usually just undiscovered risk.
  • You want engineers who will tell you honestly when your problem does not need a contract, or a blockchain, at all (and hand you the simpler, reversible, off-chain design), rather than a shop with an incentive to build the on-chain system you assumed you wanted.
  • You want the security taken as seriously as the losses in this space warrant: an independent audit before any contract touches value, key custody and access control designed deliberately, and the irreversibility of the whole thing respected rather than glossed over with a promise to "fix it in the next version" that immutable code does not permit.

What Smart Contract Development includes

The concrete pieces of work this covers, scoped to what your problem actually needs.

  • Specification and threat modelling

    The most important code in a contract is the code you decide not to allow. We start by writing down precisely what the contract must do, what it must never do, who every actor is and what each may touch, and the invariants that must hold at all times: total supply, ownership, balances that must reconcile. We threat-model against the known vulnerability classes before implementation, because a flaw specified in is a flaw deployed, and once deployed it cannot be specified back out.

  • Solidity and Vyper implementation

    We write EVM contracts in Solidity, and in Vyper where its deliberately constrained design reduces risk for a given contract. We build on OpenZeppelin and other well-reviewed libraries rather than reimplementing solved problems, keep contracts small and composable, and prefer the boring, audited construction to the clever, novel one. The goal throughout is code that a human auditor can hold in their head, because a contract nobody can fully reason about is a contract nobody can fully trust.

  • Token standards and on-chain assets

    Where an asset genuinely needs to exist on-chain, we implement the relevant standards correctly (ERC-20 for fungible tokens, ERC-721 and ERC-1155 for non-fungible and multi-token assets), to the specification rather than an approximation, because wallets, exchanges and other contracts rely on that behaviour being exactly right. We are explicit about the boundary: this is a technical mechanism for representing and transferring ownership. We do not promote tokens as investments and we give no financial advice.

  • Testing, static analysis and fuzzing

    We develop test-first, asserting invariants explicitly and testing adversarially, assuming the contract will be attacked, because if it holds value it will be. Alongside unit and integration tests we run fork tests against real chain state, static analysers that catch known vulnerability patterns mechanically, and property-based and fuzz testing where the contract’s complexity warrants it. Whole classes of bug are caught by tooling before a human review, so human attention is spent on the logic errors tools cannot see.

  • Upgradeability and access control

    Immutable code cannot be patched, so whether (and how), a contract can be upgraded is a deliberate design decision with real trade-offs. A proxy pattern buys the ability to fix bugs but adds a powerful admin key that is itself an attack surface and a centralisation of trust; genuine immutability removes that key but removes the fix too. We make that choice against your actual risk model, design access control and key custody around whatever we choose, and write the trade-off down so it is understood rather than inherited by accident.

  • Gas optimisation and deployment

    Every operation on-chain costs gas, and inefficient contracts cost your users real money on every interaction. We profile and optimise where it is worth it (storage layout, loop and branch costs, batching), but always after correctness is settled and never at its expense, because a cheaper contract that is subtly wrong is the worst possible outcome. Deployment itself is treated as a security event: verified source, checked constructor parameters, and a deliberate, rehearsed process rather than a single irreversible click made under pressure.

Where it fits

  • A token that has to be exactly right

    A team that genuinely needs a fungible or non-fungible token on an EVM chain, where wallets, exchanges and other contracts will rely on its behaviour conforming exactly to the standard. We implement ERC-20, ERC-721 or ERC-1155 to spec, build on audited libraries, test the edge cases that break naive implementations, and have the contract independently audited before it holds value, while being clear throughout that we build the transfer mechanism, not advise anyone to buy anything.

  • Multi-party settlement or escrow logic

    Several parties who need funds or assets to move according to fixed rules that no single participant can override. An escrow that releases on defined conditions, a settlement contract between organisations that do not trust one another to hold the pen. We specify the state machine precisely, encode the permissions and invariants, test every path including the adversarial ones, and audit before deployment, because this is exactly the kind of value-holding logic where an access-control slip or a reentrancy flaw becomes an irreversible loss.

  • A protocol integrating external data or contracts

    A contract whose logic depends on other contracts or on off-chain data through an oracle. A lending rule keyed to a price, a mechanism composing with existing protocols. This is where oracle manipulation and unexpected composability become the dominant risks, so we model the ways a fed price or a called contract could be made to lie or misbehave, design against them, and fork-test against real chain conditions rather than a friendly local mock.

  • Auditing or rescuing existing contracts

    An organisation with contracts already written or deployed (perhaps by a previous team, perhaps in a hurry), that needs an independent, adversarial review before it holds real value, or after a near-miss. We review the code for the known vulnerability classes, examine the upgrade and key-custody arrangements, and give a prioritised account of what must be fixed and what the immutability of the deployment means for the options actually available. Sometimes the honest finding is that redeploying safely beats trying to patch around a flaw the design cannot escape.

How we approach Smart Contract Development

We approach smart contract work as safety-critical engineering, and the first thing that means is a question rather than a keyboard: does this actually need to be a smart contract, or a blockchain, at all? A surprising amount of logic that arrives described as a contract is business rules that a conventional backend runs more simply, more cheaply and (the property that matters most), reversibly, with the ability to correct a mistake that on-chain code never grants. When that is the case we say so plainly and draw you the simpler design. We would rather forgo the build than ship you immutable code you did not need and then watch a bug in it become permanent.

When a contract is genuinely warranted, we build it the way the stakes demand: specification and invariants first, implementation on well-reviewed standard libraries, test-driven development throughout, static analysis and fuzzing wired into the build, a full run on a public testnet, and an independent audit before a single wei of real value is at risk. The engineers who write the contract are the ones who test and reason about it, and nothing reaches mainnet on optimism. This is deliberately slower and more expensive than the cheap-and-fast alternative, and that alternative, in this domain, is dangerous, because it produces exactly the unaudited, value-holding contracts that become the next well-known loss.

The secure development lifecycle, spec to mainnet

The lifecycle is the product here, because in immutable software the order and rigour of the steps are what stand between you and a permanent mistake. We begin with a written specification: the exact behaviour, the actors and their permissions, and the invariants that must always hold. From that we implement test-first (every rule expressed as a test before the code that satisfies it), building on established libraries and standard patterns rather than novel constructions. Static analysers run continuously against known vulnerability signatures, and where a contract’s complexity warrants it we add property-based and fuzz testing that hurls thousands of adversarial inputs at the invariants to try to break them mechanically.

Only once the contract passes its own suite does it go to a public testnet, where it is exercised against real network conditions, real gas costs and real integration with wallets and other contracts. Then (and this step is not optional), it goes to an independent audit, arranged with a reputable third party, because the people who wrote a contract are the worst-placed to find their own blind spots in code that cannot be patched. Audit findings are fixed and re-reviewed, not waved through. Deployment to mainnet is treated as a security event in its own right: verified source, checked parameters, a rehearsed and deliberate process. And we hand over with the tests, the documentation and the operational runbook, so your own team can reason about and, where the design allows, safely evolve the system.

Keeping contracts small, and keeping most things off them

The defining architectural discipline in contract work is minimalism: the less a contract does, and the smaller it is, the fewer places it can go wrong and the more completely a human can reason about it. So we decompose logic into small, composable contracts with clear responsibilities, we prefer standard audited components to bespoke ones, and we resist the temptation to put logic on-chain that has no need to be there. A contract is a small, deliberate, trusted core, not a workhorse to which everything is added because it can be.

That extends to data. Blockchains are poor databases and worse file stores: every byte stored on-chain is paid for in gas, permanent by design and transparent to everyone, forever. So anything large, anything private, and anything you might ever need to correct belongs off-chain in conventional storage, with only the minimal authoritative state (a balance, an owner, a hash), held by the contract. The upgradeability decision sits here too: a proxy pattern adds a fixable seam at the cost of a powerful admin key and a more complex trust model, and we choose deliberately against your risk profile rather than reaching for a proxy by reflex. A well-judged on-chain system ends up looking like mostly-ordinary software with a small, carefully-bounded contract at its heart, which is exactly right, and is the architecture our dApp and blockchain development work is built to surround.

The vulnerability classes, and how we prevent them

Smart contract security is a discipline of its own because the failure modes are both well-catalogued and unforgiving. Reentrancy: where a contract calls out to another that calls back in before the first has updated its state, has drained real systems of enormous sums; we prevent it by following the checks-effects-interactions ordering, using reentrancy guards, and treating every external call as hostile. Integer overflow and underflow, which once silently minted value from nothing, are largely handled by modern Solidity’s checked arithmetic and by using audited safe-math where it is not, but we still test the boundaries explicitly rather than trusting the compiler blindly. Access-control failures. A missing modifier, an unprotected initialiser, an owner check that is not there, have handed strangers the keys to entire contracts; we specify permissions up front, apply them consistently, and test every privileged path from an unprivileged caller to prove the door is actually locked.

Beyond those, oracle manipulation is a first-class threat for any contract whose logic depends on external data: a price feed that can be moved, even briefly, is a lever an attacker will pull, so we design for manipulation-resistant sources and test against a hostile feed rather than a friendly one. Unexpected composability (other contracts interacting with yours in ways you did not anticipate), is met by threat-modelling the interactions and fork-testing against real chain state. Front-running and transaction ordering, denial-of-service through unbounded loops, and the concentration of power in an upgrade or admin key are each considered explicitly rather than discovered in production. And underpinning all of it: key management. In these systems a private key is the whole of authority: lose it and control is gone, leak it and someone else has it, with no administrator anywhere to reset anything, so we design custody deliberately, with hardware-backed and multi-signature keys where control must be shared and tested recovery procedures rather than an afterthought. None of this is theoretical. Every one of these classes has caused a public, irreversible loss, which is exactly why an independent audit before mainnet is non-negotiable, and why we will not ship without one.

Honesty first, then unforgiving engineering

The methodology rests on two convictions. The first is that a smart contract (like the blockchain it runs on), is justified far less often than the field pretends. The immutability and decentralisation that make a contract valuable are the same properties that make it dangerous and expensive, and for most business logic they buy you nothing you needed while taking away the ability to fix a mistake. So we lead with the sceptical question and treat "this does not need to be a contract" as a legitimate, valuable deliverable rather than a lost sale. Anyone offering cheap, fast smart contracts without serious testing and audit is, bluntly, dangerous: that combination is precisely how value-holding contracts ship with the flaws that become the next headline loss, and we will not compete on it.

The second conviction is that when a contract is genuinely warranted, it must be engineered as the unforgiving software it is. Specification and invariants before code; standard, audited components over novel cleverness; test-driven development, static analysis and fuzzing throughout; a full testnet run; and an independent third-party audit before any real value is at stake. The engineers who write the contract test and reason about it, and nothing reaches mainnet on optimism. We also hold a firm line on remit: we build engineering, not speculation. We do not give financial or investment advice, we do not promote tokens or cryptocurrency, and where regulation touches what a contract does, securities law, consumer protection, data protection and its right to erasure sitting in direct tension with an immutable public ledger. We make sure the position is understood before deployment rather than discovered after.

Technologies we build it with

Chosen per problem, not per fashion. This is the stack we most often reach for on this work.

How we deliver

  1. 01

    Discover

    We map the system, the constraints and the business it serves, including the parts nobody documented.

    Architecture brief

  2. 02

    Architect

    Decisions get made, written down and defended before a line of production code exists.

    Decision records

  3. 03

    Build

    Short cycles against working software. You see progress in the product, not in a status deck.

    Shipping increments

  4. 04

    Operate

    Monitoring, incident response and iteration. The system is alive, so the engagement is too.

    Runbooks & SLOs

Want a straight answer on Smart Contract Development?

A short call with a senior engineer, before you write a brief. If Smart Contract Development is the wrong answer for your situation, we will say so and tell you what we think is right.

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What changes

  • Code that survives being immutable

    Small, standards-based, adversarially-tested and independently-audited contracts that go to mainnet having already been attacked in a safe environment, so the permanence and public exploitability of the deployment are an engineered strength rather than a waiting catastrophe.

  • The known attacks designed out

    Reentrancy, overflow, access-control and oracle-manipulation failures modelled and prevented before deployment rather than discovered in production, because in immutable code these are not bugs you patch. They are losses you cannot reverse.

  • The right tool, honestly chosen

    You leave the feasibility stage knowing whether you genuinely need a smart contract at all, and, more often than the field admits, with a simpler, cheaper, reversible off-chain design instead and the build budget still in your pocket.

Industries we serve

Domain knowledge changes what gets built. A few of the sectors we know before the first meeting.

How pricing works

  • A paid discovery and feasibility assessment first (often the most valuable thing we do), establishing whether your problem needs a smart contract, or a blockchain, at all before any build is committed. When the honest answer is a conventional backend, this small fee is the whole cost you pay, and it will have saved you the build and the irreversibility that came with it.
  • Fixed-scope contract development for well-defined systems (a token to a known standard, a defined settlement or escrow mechanism), quoted once the specification and invariants are settled, so the price reflects an agreed design rather than a guess, and with the independent audit costed in from the start rather than sprung on you at the end.
  • Standalone smart-contract audits and security reviews of existing on-chain code, priced by assessment, because in this domain an unreviewed contract deployed against value is an open-ended liability and the review is worth doing entirely on its own.
  • Monthly senior engagement for evolving protocols where scope shifts and you want continuity from the same engineers who specified, wrote, tested and understand how to operate the contracts safely.

Typical timeline

  1. 01

    Specification and threat modelling

    Typically one to two weeks establishing whether a contract is warranted at all (and handing you the simpler off-chain design when it is not), then, if it is, writing the exact behaviour, the actors, the permissions and the invariants, and threat-modelling against the known vulnerability classes. These are the decisions that become permanent once deployed, so they are settled before any contract code exists.

  2. 02

    Test-driven implementation

    Two to four weeks, and often more for a complex protocol, building the contract test-first on well-reviewed standard libraries, with unit, integration and fork tests, static analysis and (where warranted), fuzzing running against the invariants throughout. Correctness is settled here; gas optimisation follows it and never precedes it.

  3. 03

    Testnet and independent audit

    The contract runs on a public testnet against real conditions, then goes to an independent third-party audit. A non-optional step, because the authors are the worst-placed to find their own blind spots in code that cannot be patched. Findings are fixed and re-reviewed rather than waved through, which means this phase can extend depending on what the audit surfaces.

  4. 04

    Deployment and handover

    Mainnet deployment treated as a security event (verified source, checked parameters, a rehearsed and deliberate process), followed by handover of the tests, documentation and operational runbook so your own team can reason about, monitor and, where the design allows, safely evolve the system long after the engagement ends.

What working with us actually means

  • We treat contracts as safety-critical software

    A deployed contract is immutable, public and exploitable the instant it is live, and holds real value, which puts it closer to safety-critical engineering than to a web feature. We resource it that way: specification and invariants first, test-driven development, static analysis and fuzzing throughout, and an independent audit before mainnet, every time. Nothing ships on optimism, because optimism is what produces the next well-known loss.

  • We will tell you not to build it

    A great many contract briefs describe logic a conventional backend runs more simply, more cheaply and reversibly. When that is the finding, we say so before you spend a build budget and hand you the simpler design. That honesty is our differentiator, not a quota to fill, if you genuinely need on-chain logic we will build it properly, and if you do not, you will hear that first and clearly.

  • Standards and audits, not cheap-and-fast

    We build on OpenZeppelin and other battle-tested libraries rather than novel constructions, keep contracts small enough for a human to reason about, and insist on independent audit before any contract holds value. Anyone offering cheap, fast smart contracts without serious testing and audit is dangerous, and we will not compete on that basis. The cost of getting it wrong here is not a bug report, it is an irreversible loss.

  • Engineering, not speculation

    We build smart contracts; we do not give financial or investment advice and we do not promote buying tokens or cryptocurrency. Where a project genuinely needs a token we implement the standard correctly and treat it as a technical mechanism for representing ownership, never as something to speculate on. If your idea depends on the speculative value of a token rather than a genuine engineering need, we are not the right firm for it.

How to engage us

Three ways to work with us on this, chosen to fit the problem, not our margin.

Related services

Part of Digital Transformation. Other work we do alongside this.

Common questions

Do we actually need a smart contract, or would a normal backend do the job?

Very often a normal backend, and we would rather establish that before you pay to deploy immutable code. A smart contract earns its considerable cost only when you genuinely need logic that runs identically for everyone, that no single party can pause or reverse, and that operates among participants who do not trust one another and will not accept a central operator. If a single organisation controls the logic, or a trusted operator is acceptable, a conventional backend does the same work more simply, more cheaply and (the property that matters most), reversibly, so that a mistake is a fix rather than a permanent loss. When that is the finding, and it frequently is, we tell you plainly and hand you the simpler design. Our blockchain development service applies the same honest test to the wider question of whether you need a chain at all.

Why is an independent audit non-negotiable, and can we skip it to save money and time?

No, and the reason is the nature of the software rather than caution for its own sake. A deployed contract cannot be patched, is executed faithfully by every node, and typically sits directly on top of value, so a bug is not a ticket: it is an irreversible, publicly exploitable loss. The engineers who wrote a contract are the worst-placed to find their own blind spots in it, which is exactly why a reputable independent audit before mainnet is a fixed part of how we work, costed in from the start. Skipping it to save money is how value-holding contracts ship with the flaws that become the next well-known headline loss. If a firm offers you a cheap, fast contract without serious testing and audit, that is not a bargain. It is the specific combination that has drained real systems, and we will not provide it.

What are the vulnerabilities you actually design against?

The catalogued classes that have caused real, irreversible losses. Reentrancy, where an external call re-enters your contract before its state is updated: prevented by checks-effects-interactions ordering, reentrancy guards, and treating every external call as hostile. Integer overflow and underflow: handled by modern Solidity’s checked arithmetic and audited safe-math, with the boundaries still tested explicitly. Access-control failures like a missing modifier or an unprotected initialiser: met by specifying permissions up front and testing every privileged path from an unprivileged caller. Oracle manipulation, where a contract depends on external data that can be moved: met with manipulation-resistant sources and hostile-feed testing. Plus front-running, denial-of-service through unbounded loops, unexpected composability with other contracts, and the concentration of power in an admin or upgrade key. Each is considered deliberately, not discovered in production, and the whole lot is checked again by an independent audit before deployment.

The contract is immutable, so how do we fix a bug or change the rules later?

This is the crux of the whole discipline, and the honest answer is that you decide it before you deploy, because afterwards your options are fixed. There are two paths, each with real trade-offs. Genuine immutability means the code can never change: maximally trustless, but a bug is permanent and a rule can never be updated. An upgradeable proxy pattern keeps a fixable seam, but at the cost of a powerful admin key that is itself an attack surface and a centralisation of the very trust the contract was meant to remove. We make that choice deliberately against your actual risk model rather than reaching for a proxy by reflex, design the access control and key custody around whatever we choose, and write the trade-off down. What we never do is treat "we will fix it in the next version" as a safety net, because immutable code does not offer one, which is exactly why the testing and audit come first.

Can you write and deploy a token so we can raise money from it?

We can implement a token to the relevant standard correctly and safely, and we will be clear about the boundary of what that is. Yarqat is a software and AI engineering consultancy: we build smart contracts as a technical mechanism for representing and transferring ownership on-chain, we do not give investment or financial advice, and we do not promote or help you promote buying a token or cryptocurrency. Where a project has a genuine engineering need for a token we implement ERC-20, ERC-721 or ERC-1155 to specification, test it, have it independently audited, and make sure the regulatory position (which around tokens and fundraising is significant and jurisdiction-dependent), is understood before deployment rather than after. But what a token might be worth, and whether anyone should buy it, is outside what we do and will not comment on. If your idea depends on the speculative value of a token rather than a real engineering need, we are not the right firm for it.

Thinking about Smart Contract Development?

Tell us the problem in your own words, not in requirements. A senior engineer reads it and comes back with a straight view on whether Smart Contract Development is the right answer here, or what would be.

  1. 01A senior engineer reads it. Not a form queue, and not an account manager.
  2. 02We reply either with questions or with a straight answer that we are not the right fit.
  3. 03If it looks like a fit, a technical call with the person who would actually run the delivery.
  4. 04Then scope, effort and risk in writing, before anyone signs anything.
Or book a free consultationPick a time that suits you. No pitch, no obligation.Prefer email? support@yarqat.com

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